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The boundaries of technology-intensive firms are determined not only by
economic considerations, but also by legal constraints. The law plays a dual
role: First, by granting property right protection to certain types of information
and withholding such protection from others, the law determines which innovations will be organized under a property-rights-based model and which will be
organized by means of access control and restrictions on employee mobility.
When information is protected by property rights, the optimal organization of
innovation answers the question, “Who should own the innovation?” When
information is not protected by property rights, this basic question becomes
meaningless, and other sources of control—like access to the innovation and
contractual restrictions on employee mobility—come to the fore. This brings us
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to the second role that law plays in drawing the boundaries of technologyintensive firms. In the absence of property rights in the innovation, covenants
not to compete (CNCs) become critical in determining incentives and overall
efficiency. The law imposes substantial restrictions on the scope and substance
of CNCs. In some cases it is legal doctrine, rather than economic considerations, that determines the organization of innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
The theory of the firm asks when an intermediate good should be
produced in-house and when it should be purchased on the market
from an upstream supplier. In technology-intensive industries, one of
the central intermediate goods is information or innovation. The question thus becomes which stages of the inventive process should be integrated in a single firm and which should be divided among different
firms and traded on the market. The theoretical investigation of the
optimal boundary between firm and market cannot be carried out in a
legal vacuum. Ideally, only economic considerations should affect the
“make or buy” decision. In practice, however, law imposes an important constraint on the economic balance between firms and markets.
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We focus on the property rights theory of the firm pioneered by
1
Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore and applied to the
2
innovation context by Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole. Aghion and
Tirole show both when integration is efficient and when nonintegration is efficient. Their analysis realistically assumes that “the exact nature of the innovation is ill-defined ex ante and the two parties cannot
3
contract for delivery of a specific innovation.” But Aghion and Tirole
also assume that the contract can specify “the allocation of the property
4
right on any forthcoming innovation.”
Implicit in Aghion and Tirole’s framework is the notion that
property rights in the innovation are legally recognized. Is it necessarily the case that innovation is protected by property rights? The assumption that property rights in the intermediate good are legally
recognized is, in many contexts, completely innocuous. Obviously,
the law recognizes property rights in the proverbial widget. But this
key assumption is not innocuous in the innovation context. Legal

1

See generally OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
(1995); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).
2
Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, The Management of Innovation, 109 Q.J. ECON.
1185 (1994). The property rights theory is not the only possible framework for studying the boundaries of technology-intensive firms. Early contributions in the tradition
of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) include OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES 127-28 (1975), which pioneered and developed TCE theory that focuses
on the ex post bureaucracy costs of integration; David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15
RES. POL’Y 285, 288-96 (1986) [hereinafter Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation], who argued that when innovation is easy, a firm’s ability to profit from innovation may depend on its ability to control assets complementary to innovations, such as
manufacturing or distribution; and David J. Teece, Technological Change and the Nature
of the Firm, in TECHNICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC THEORY 256, 256-81 (Giovanni Dosi
et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter Teece, Technological Change]. The importance of appropriability and its relationship with intellectual property rights was first emphasized in
Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation, supra, at 287. Arora et al. highlight the
difficulty in contracting over tacit knowledge and know-how, noting “the role of patents in facilitating transactions in technology.” ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR
TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 262
(2001). Scott Masten provides a detailed account of the distinct features of the legal
rules governing the employment relationship of firms. See Scott E. Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181, 185-89 (1988) (noting the duties, obligations,
sanctions, and procedures under such legal rules).
3
Aighon & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1186.
4
Id. at 1189.
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doctrine is continuously struggling to define what classes of informa5
tion are worthy of property right protection.
This is not to say that most types of innovation are not legally protected. Probably most types of economically valuable innovation are
protected by property rights. Accordingly, Aghion and Tirole’s model
clearly covers a broad class of cases. But, we argue, there is another
class of cases that the Aghion and Tirole model does not cover—cases
where the innovation is not protected by property rights. Aghion and
Tirole derived the optimal organization of innovation, assuming legally recognized property rights in the innovation. How would innovation be organized absent such property rights? We answer this question, emphasizing the differences between the organization of
innovation with and without property rights. These differences underscore the important effect of legal policy—which determines the scope
6
of property right protection—on the organization of innovation.
To study the organization of innovation in the absence of property rights, we revert back to the notion of control that underlies the

5

See infra Part II.
While Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, and the literature that builds on their
analysis assume that the innovation is protected by property rights, another strand in
the literature adopts the opposite assumption. These authors and others recognize
that property rights in information are often imperfect or even nonexistent, and proceed to study how the innovator can extract value from a downstream customer in the
absence of property rights. See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 190, 191-92
(1994) [hereinafter Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions] (arguing that despite
the risk of expropriation, a financially weak independent inventor selling an invention
for which no property rights exist can nonetheless appropriate a sizable share of the
market value of the invention by revealing the invention to an informed buyer); James
J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Start-Ups, Spin-Offs, and Internal Projects, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
362, 363 (1995) [hereinafter Anton & Yao, Start-Ups] (examining the “incentive conflict” facing an employee who discovers a private innovation for which no property
rights exist and must choose between keeping the innovation private or disclosing the
innovation to the employer); Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, The Product Market and the
Market for “Ideas”: Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs, 32 RES. POL’Y
333, 348 (2003) (finding that “when weak intellectual property for innovation exists
alongside low barriers to entry, competitive commercialization strategies are more
likely”); Mariagiovanna Baccara & Ronny Razin, Curb Your Innovation: Corporate Conservatism in the Presence of Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights 11-20 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy
Research, Discussion Paper No. 4466, 2004), available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/
dps/DP4466.asp (considering the same spin-off-or-disclose dilemma facing employees
creating innovations with imperfect property rights examined in Anton & Yao, StartUps, supra, and examining the effects of various employer attributes on the efficiency
of spinning-off or disclosing). These papers, however, do not ask the “boundaries of
the firm” question (at least not within the framework of the property rights theory of
the firm).
6
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property rights theory of the firm. We argue that control can exist,
and be allocated, even absent property rights. We focus on two alternative sources of control: access to the innovation and contractual restrictions on employee mobility.
The first, nonproperty source of control is access to the innova7
tion. We define “nonintegration” as the case where the research unit
can withhold knowledge of the innovation from the customer, and
“integration” as the case where the existence and substance of the innovation are known by both the research unit and the customer. Under our definitions of access-based organization, the research unit
may enjoy control via exclusive access in the nonintegration case. The
real power that access provides is determined by the choices available
to the research unit. Specifically, can the research unit (RU) extract
surplus from the customer (C ) without relinquishing control—that is,
8
without disclosing the innovation to the customer?
In many cases the answer is no. If RU cannot develop the innovation itself and must sell it to a customer, then the two parties engage
in bargaining under asymmetric information—bargaining that may
7

But see Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A
Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms, 116 Q.J. ECON. 805, 841 (2001) [hereinafter
Rajan & Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy] (defining control as “the right to
determine current access,” as compared to ownership, “which gives the owner the right
to determine access now and in the future”). Rajan and Zingales observe that the
Grossman-Hart-Moore Property Rights Theory “does not deem current access necessary in any way (ownership is important only in that it helps control future access).” Id.
We are not the first to study the role of access in a theory of the firm that is founded
on notions of contractual incompleteness and control. Rajan and Zingales emphasize
the role of access in organizational design. See id. at 813, 841 (focusing on access as a
mechanism for allocating power within a firm); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales,
Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387, 388 (1998); see also Krishnamurthy
Subramanian, A Theory of Financing of Ideas 3-5 ( July 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (focusing specifically on modeling access to ideas). The
notion of access adopted in this paper also relates to the notion of real authority developed by Aghion and Tirole. See Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1, 2 (1997) (describing real authority as “an
effective control over decisions”). Hvide relates organizational structure to the employer’s knowledge about “the progress and content of the projects the workers are
engaged in,” arguing that in smaller firms the employer is better informed; the employer’s knowledge depends on access as determined by the organizational structure
or firm size. Hans K. Hvide, The Quality of Entrepreneurs, 119 ECON. J. (forthcoming
2009) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=545144. Gans and
Stern refer to secrecy as an informal appropriability mechanism, as compared to formal intellectual property rights. See Gans & Stern, supra note 6, at 335.
8
Following Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1186, we call the upstream creator of
the information (or the inventor) the “research unit” and the downstream user of the
information (who may proceed to develop it further) the “customer.”

1654

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 157: 1649

well result in impasse. As Kenneth Arrow famously observed, information that is not afforded legal protection cannot be bought or sold on
the market. Absent legal protection, the information holder is in a
bind: in order to sell the information, she must disclose it to the po9
tential buyer, but once she does, she has nothing left to sell.
Faced with the disclosure paradox, often the best that RU can do
is disclose the innovation to C, free of charge, and then bargain under
conditions of symmetric information. As Anton and Yao show, RU
may still be able to extract a significant portion of the surplus from C
even after disclosing the innovation to C by threatening to disclose the
10
innovation to C ’s competitors. Since the best strategy for RU is to
disclose the innovation to C, the fact that RU initially enjoyed exclusive access to the innovation is meaningless, and the distinction between integration and nonintegration collapses.
There are circumstances, however, where access does imply actual
control and can thus provide a basis for a theory of organizational design. First, there are cases where RU will choose to negotiate with C
11
before disclosing the innovation despite the disclosure paradox.
12
Second, when RU can develop the innovation itself, access improves
RU’s bargaining position and thus implies control. Third, in some
cases, RU can disclose only part of the innovation to C and then bargain with C for a share of the surplus larger than what it could obtain

9

Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 615 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962) (“In the absence of special legal protection, the owner cannot . . .
simply sell information on the open market. Any one purchaser can destroy the monopoly, since he can reproduce the information at little or no cost.”); see also Anton &
Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 191 (“[I]f the inventor first reveals
information regarding the invention, a lack of property rights makes it possible for the
newly informed party to ‘steal’ or ‘expropriate’ the invention.”).
10
Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 192 (arguing that a
contract between RU and C may be negotiated at this point to garner benefits); see also
Baccara & Razin, supra note 6, at 1-4 (discussing possible choices and outcomes for RU ).
11
See Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 191 (noting that
an inventor could negotiate without disclosing the innovation, but buyers are understandably “hesitant to buy . . . an unknown commodity”).
12
See Anton & Yao, Start-Ups, supra note 6, at 363 (noting that an employee who
develops a reproducible innovation can leave the firm and start a new company); see
also Gans & Stern, supra note 6, at 336 (observing that an innovator’s profitability depends, in part, on her ability to establish market presence).
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13

after full disclosure. Finally, in some cases RU can leverage access
and force C to sign a nondisclosure agreement (NDA).
We characterize the optimal access-based organization of innovation and compare social welfare under access-based organization with
welfare when property rights in the innovation are recognized and the
organization of innovation can be based on the allocation of these
property rights. We show that the organization of innovation, and its
welfare consequences, depends on the legal policy that sets the scope
of intellectual property rights.
The second, nonproperty source of control derives from contractual restrictions on employee mobility or covenants not to compete
(CNCs). CNCs are easy for courts to enforce even in an environment
fraught with noncontractibility (like the innovation environment).
Oliver Hart observed that in technology-intensive industries, the firm’s
“source of value may consist of as little as . . . a contract that prohibits
14
[the firm’s] workers from working for competitors.”
Nonhuman assets are the source of control in the property rights
theory. The emphasis on nonhuman assets is motivated by “the ab15
sence of slavery,” which implies that control over human assets is inalienable and thus cannot be allocated. The important role of CNCs,
as recognized by Hart, suggests that, at least in technology-intensive
sectors, nonhuman assets are not the only, and perhaps not the main,
source of control. Control over human assets can be allocated. Of
course, the reach of CNCs is limited. And it is the law that sets the
limit, taking into consideration, among other things, the inalienability
concerns raised by Hart.
CNCs differ from the standard assets that serve as a source of control in yet another way. The standard assets are discrete. A machine is
16
either owned by A or by B. CNCs, on the other hand, allocate control in a continuous manner. The strength of a CNC depends on its
geographical and temporal reach—both continuous dimensions.
13

See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property
Rights, and Contracting, 69 REV. ECON. STUD. 513, 514-15 (2002) (describing how, in
competitive markets, partial disclosure can drive up an innovator’s profits).
14
HART, supra note 1, at 57.
15
Id. at 29.
16
Joint ownership is also possible. Joint ownership may seem to allow for a continuous allocation of control, similar to the type that we attributed to CNCs. See infra
text accompanying notes 54-56. The ownership shares can be continuous: A can own
X % and B can own (100 – X )%. But these continuous-ownership shares do not translate into a continuous allocation of control: either one party has decision rights or
each party has veto power.
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Stronger CNCs increase the customer’s control and thus enhance her
incentives to invest. At the extreme, a very powerful CNC can mimic
the incentives generated when the innovation is protected by property
17
rights and these rights are allocated to C (the integration case). A
CNC, as a continuous contracting variable, allows the parties to opti18
mally calibrate incentives, at least within certain bounds.
As suggested above, one such bound is defined by the law. The
law imposes an upper bound on the strength of enforceable CNCs.
When the marginal efficiency of the customer’s investment is small
enough relative to that of the research unit’s investment, this constraint is not binding. But when the marginal efficiency of the customer’s investment is large enough relative to that of the research
unit’s investment, this legal constraint is binding. In these cases, the
organization of innovation is determined by legal, not economic,
19
considerations.
The law thus plays a dual role. First, by setting the scope of property right protection, it selects between property-based organization of
innovation and CNC-based organization of innovation. We emphasize
the differences between these two forms of organization and the welfare consequences of these differences. Second, when one arm of the
law precludes property-based organization, a second arm of the law
determines, in some cases, the specific organizational structure by limiting the range of enforceable CNCs.
The burden of this paper is to identify and begin to explore the
central role that the law plays in setting the boundaries of technology17

At the other extreme, a very weak noncompete clause brings us back to the outcome described in the case where the innovation is not legally protected. The employee’s incentives to invest in this scenario can be very weak (depending on the effect
of the employee’s threat to leave and go work for a competitor). In particular, while
we associate weak noncompete clauses with nonintegration, the incentives that such
nonintegration provides for employees can be much weaker than the incentives provided to employees when the innovation is protected by property rights and these
rights are allocated to the employee (as in the nonintegration case).
18
Cf. Eric A. Posner et al., Investing in Human Capital: The Efficiency of Covenants
Not to Compete 3 (Univ. of Va. Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/
uvalwps/olin/art11 (arguing that the scope of the CNC is set to induce privately, but
not socially, optimal incentives to invest in human capital).
19
As described infra Part II, successful innovation can occur in the absence of enforceable CNCs. The prime example is the success of Silicon Valley despite the refusal of
California law to enforce CNCs. In certain cases (or places) there may be other forces
outside of our model that enable efficient innovation absent CNCs. This observation,
however, does not undermine our analysis. In many other cases (or places), CNCs are
important and the law’s restrictions on CNCs affect the organization of innovation.
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intensive firms. As suggested above, the law plays a dual role: First,
once we realize that property rights in innovation should not be taken
for granted, it becomes clear that the legal determination of which
categories of information will be protected by property rights has a direct effect on the boundaries of the firm question. Specifically, the
basic question “who should own the innovation?” becomes meaningless, and other sources of control, like access to the innovation and
contractual restrictions on employee mobility, come to the fore. This
brings us to the second role that law plays in drawing the boundaries
of technology-intensive firms. In the absence of property rights in the
innovation, CNCs become critical in determining incentives and overall efficiency. The law imposes substantial restrictions on the scope
and substance of CNCs. In some cases these legal constraints, rather
than economic considerations, determine the strength of the CNC
and thus the organization of innovation.
In addition to the various strands of literature surveyed above, this
paper relates to several recent contributions exploring the role of law,
and specifically the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs), in setting the boundaries of technology-intensive firms. Arora and Merges
argue that stronger IPRs contribute to the viability of small, specialized firms, and thus favor independent suppliers over vertical integra20
tion. Arora and Merges, however, “neglect[] the possibility that a
captive supplier could quit the parent firm and join a rival [or start a
21
new firm].” We incorporate this possibility in our analysis, and we
thus reach more nuanced conclusions about the relationship between
22
IPRs and firm boundaries.

20

Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm
Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 451 (2004); see also Ashish Arora & Alfonso
Gambardella, The Changing Technology of Technological Change: General and Abstract
Knowledge and the Division of Innovative Labour, 23 RES. POL’Y 523, 529 n.13 (1994) (noting that strong intellectual property rights have encouraged specialization in fields
such as biotechnology); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights, Input Markets,
and the Value of Intangible Assets 3-4 (Feb. 9, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/iprights.pdf (calling IPRs the “crown jewels” of small firms).
21
Arora & Merges, supra note 20, at 456.
22
Also, much of the analysis in Arora & Merges, supra note 20, can be interpreted
as proposing one way to minimize the costs associated with the disclosure paradox—
through intellectual property rights in complementary assets. See also ARORA ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 116-17 (noting that an innovator can protect herself by withholding
the “know-how” of complementary technology). Our focus, on the other hand, is on
intellectual property rights in core informational assets.
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Burk and McDonnell offer a detailed account of how different
doctrines of intellectual property law affect the relative costs of inte23
gration and nonintegration. Their main argument is that the law
24
should avoid excessively strong IPRs. This conclusion follows from
their assumption about the stickiness of IPRs. Specifically, they assume that if the law initially allocates strong property rights to C, it will
25
be costly to reallocate these rights (or some of them) to RU. Without
denying that the reallocation of property rights may be costly, we believe that it is useful to begin with the benchmark assumption,
adopted in much of the property rights literature, that if the law recognizes property rights in the innovation, the cost of allocating or reallocating these rights between the parties is low.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Part I studies
the organization of innovation absent legally recognized property
rights, and demonstrates the important role that law plays in setting
the boundaries of technology-intensive firms. Part II provides a brief
and selective summary of the relevant legal doctrines. We begin by
surveying the law that determines the range of innovations that are afforded property right protection and can thus be organized based on
the allocation of these property rights. We then describe the law governing CNCs, which, as explained above, determines, in some cases,
the specific organizational structure. A brief conclusion follows.
I. ORGANIZING INNOVATION WITHOUT PROPERTY RIGHTS
The organization of innovation depends on whether the law recognizes property rights in the innovation. Some categories of innovation enjoy property right protection, while others do not. Since
Aghion and Tirole have studied the organization of innovation under
the assumption that property rights in innovation are legally recog26
nized, we focus on those categories of innovation that do not enjoy
27
property right protection.
23

Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575.
24
Id. at 577.
25
Id. at 597-600.
26
Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1186-87 (noting the focus on the legal features
of research and development).
27
In some cases assets complementary to the unprotected innovation are legally
protected. These assets can be used both conceptually—to define the boundaries of
the firm—and substantively as a means for RU to extract surplus from C. See, e.g., Arora
& Merges, supra note 20, at 453 (calling complementary assets a “safeguard”); Teece,
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A. Framework of Analysis
28

We adopt the basic structure of the Aghion and Tirole model. RU
performs research for C. The expected value of the innovation for the
customer (i.e., the probability of discovery multiplied by the value of
the innovation conditional upon discovery), V(e, E) > 0, depends on
the noncontractible investment e by RU and on the noncontractible
investment E by C. The exact nature of the innovation (i.e., the product of RU’s efforts) is ill defined ex ante and thus noncontractible.
The ex ante noncontractibility implies that incentives to invest will
be determined by the ex post division of the surplus V(e, E) between
the two parties. Let Į  [0,1] denote the share of ex post surplus that
goes to C. A higher Į implies stronger incentives for C and correspondingly weaker incentives for RU.
We focus on ex ante efficiency, which depends on the relative efficiency of the parties’ investments. Let ȕ  [0,) denote the relative
efficiency of the parties’ investments, such that a higher ȕ means that
C’s investments are relatively more efficient as compared to RU’s investments. Optimally, when ȕ is higher, Į will also be higher in order to
provide stronger incentives to C, whose investment is more important.
And when ȕ is lower, the optimal Į will also be lower in order to provide
stronger incentives to RU, whose investment is more important.
B. With Property Rights: The Aghion and Tirole Model
Aghion and Tirole assume that innovation is protected by property rights. In the Aghion and Tirole Model (A-T model), the ex ante
contract specifies the allocation of property rights on any forthcoming
29
innovation. Specifically, Aghion and Tirole consider two possible alProfiting from Technological Innovation, supra note 2, at 288-91 (describing complementary assets and calling them a “critical” bargaining chip). Following Aghion and Tirole,
supra note 2, we focus on cases where there are no significant complementary assets.
28
Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1186-87. We present a bare-bones version of
the Aghion and Tirole model, abstracting from many important features of their
model. We generalize the Aghion and Tirole model in one dimension in particular:
while Aghion and Tirole assume that the value of the innovation V is exogenous, we
allow V to depend on the parties’ investments. This generalization helps demonstrate
the effect of organizational structure in the absence of property rights in the innovation. See infra subsection II.A.5.
29
That is the only relevant factor in the contract. The contract can also specify a
sharing rule on the verifiable revenue (license fee) obtained by the research unit, but
Aghion and Tirole demonstrate that the sharing rule is irrelevant. See Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1193; see also HART, supra note 1, at 79 (observing that revenue- or
cost-sharing contracts do not force either party to trade under the contract).
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locations: (1) C-ownership or integration, where the property rights on
the innovation are allocated to C, and (2) RU-ownership or nonintegration, where the property rights on the innovation are allocated to RU.
They show that under integration, C’s expected payoff is V(e, E)
30
and RU’s expected payoff is 0. Under nonintegration, both C’s and
RU’s expected payoffs are ½ × V(e, E). With property rights in the inInt
NInt
novation, we have D P = 1 and D P = ½, where the P subscript denotes the existence of property rights and the superscripts Int and
NInt denote integration and nonintegration, respectively.
C. Contractible Allocation of Property Rights in a
Noncontractible Innovation
The main goal of this paper is to study the organization of innovation when the innovation is not protected by property rights. Namely,
while Aghion and Tirole assume the existence of property rights in
innovation, we will adopt the opposite assumption. We will show that
innovation will be organized differently with and without property
rights. We will then argue that since the law determines what categories of innovation receive property right protection, the law influences
the organization of innovation.
Before embarking on an analysis of the optimal organization of
innovation without property rights, we consider the consistency of the
Aghion and Tirole framework with recognized property rights.
Aghion and Tirole assume that the innovation is not contractible. But
31
if “the exact nature of the innovation is ill defined ex ante,” how can
the parties allocate property rights in the innovation? In the basic
32
property rights model, the parties allocate property rights not in the
intermediate good itself but rather in the nonhuman assets used either to produce the intermediate good or to utilize the intermediate
good in the production of the final product. There is no contractibility problem with respect to these assets. But when the relevant asset
is the intermediate good itself and this good is, by stipulation, noncontractible, why is ownership of this good contractible?
One response is that an ex ante contract can specify that anything
created by RU—for concreteness, any patents received by RU—will be
assigned to C. But such a contract is not without cost. It may well be
30

These are ex post payoffs; to get the ex ante payoffs subtract E for C and e for RU.
Aghion and Tirole, supra note 2, at 1189.
32
See, e.g., HART, supra note 1, ch. 2 (introducing and explaining the property
rights approach to the firm).
31
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the case that RU should retain ownership of some of its innovations.
More importantly, if the innovation is truly noncontractible, a contract that allocates RU’s innovations to C can be circumvented. If RU
learns that a certain innovation will be valuable, it can have the patent
registered under a friend’s name, thus avoiding the obligation to as33
sign the patent to C.
In practice, RU will be reluctant to have the patent registered in
someone else’s name. Either honesty or the desire to get credit for
one’s innovation may be enough to avoid circumvention of the contract. Reputation can also help police the contract. But these are
empirical questions. Aghion and Tirole’s theoretical framework relies
on a specific answer to these empirical questions.
D. No Property Rights
What happens when property rights in the innovation are not legally recognized? The basic question that Aghion and Tirole ask—
“Who should own the innovation?”—becomes meaningless. This, in
itself, shows the magnitude of the potential impact that the law may
have on the boundaries-of-the-firm question. The legal policy decision, whether to recognize property rights in the innovation, determines the contours of the economist’s inquiry.
The law’s refusal to recognize property rights in the innovation
does more than eliminate the who-should-own-the-innovation question. It redefines the organization-of-innovation question. While
ownership of the innovation can no longer distinguish between integration and nonintegration, other factors can step in and define the
available organizational options.
The property rights theory of the firm assumes that contracts are
incomplete and that it is therefore important to allocate control rights
to be exercised when the incomplete contract is silent. Ownership is
34
defined by residual control rights.
Going back to control as the
primitive variable in the property rights theory, is it possible to have
control without legally recognized property rights? The answer is yes.

33

Cf. id. at 79 (arguing that while “the presence of a third party can help” contractibility problems, “there is a great incentive for” the third party to collude with another
party); Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1193 (making an argument similar to ours
about the irrelevance of the initial sharing rule).
34
See HART, supra note 1, at 29-30 (defining residual-control rights as “the right to
decide all usages of the asset in any way not inconsistent with a prior contract, custom,
or law”).
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We explore two sources of control: access to the innovation and con35
tractual restraints on employee mobility.
1. Access to the Innovation
One source of control, independent of legally enforceable property rights, derives from access to the innovation. The choice between
integration and nonintegration can affect this access to the innovation. In fact, absent property rights, we propose defining the organizational form in terms of access. Specifically, we define nonintegration as the case where RU has exclusive access to the innovation and
can withhold knowledge of the innovation from C. We define integration as the case where the existence and substance of the innovation
are known by both RU and C.
Under integration, we posit, any innovation produced by RU is ac36
cessible to C. Still, since C does not have property rights in the inno37
vation, RU can disclose the innovation to C’s competitors. RU will
use the threat of disclosure to extract higher wages.
Consider the following simple model, which is a reduced-form
38
version of the Anton and Yao model. The value of the innovation to
C is V(e, E), assuming that C’s competitors do not have access to the
innovation. If RU discloses the innovation to C’s competitors, then C
will enjoy a reduced value of (1 – į) × V(e, E), where į  [0, 1]. We assume that in the bargaining between C and RU, C makes a take-it-orleave-it offer with probability ½ and RU also makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer with probability ½. Therefore, C’s expected payoff is ½ × V(e, E)
+ ½ × (1 – į) × V(e, E) or (1 – ½ × į) × V(e, E), and RU’s expected
payoff is ½ × į × V(e, E).
Under nonintegration, RU can produce the innovation and keep
it secret. In other words, RU controls the access to the innovation and

35

A clarification of terminology is in order. Our purpose is to expound the role
of law in drawing the boundaries of the firm. We thus distinguish between legally recognized property rights and other sources of control. We recognize, however, that
economists may define “property right” more broadly to coincide with “control.” But
even under this definition it would be interesting to identify and compare different
legal and extralegal sources of control.
36
The alternative case, where an employee who made a discovery can try to negotiate a wage increase while keeping the discovery secret, is in fact a nonintegration case
under our access-based definition of integration and nonintegration.
37
Alternatively, RU can leave the firm and use the innovation herself or start working for one of C’s competitors. See infra subsection I.D.2.
38
See Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 192-95.
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can withhold access from C. But, because the innovation is only valuable in C’s hands, RU must bargain with C in order to extract any
value from its investment. And C will be reluctant to enter into such
negotiations without knowing what RU has to sell. The disclosure
paradox, if applicable in its extreme form, prevents RU from reaping
any benefits from its investment, which implies that RU will not invest.
Similarly, anticipating this impediment to trade, C will not invest. The
39
result: no innovation.
But is this extreme no-trade, no-innovation result unavoidable?
No. Faced with the prospect of no innovation and a zero surplus, RU
40
is better off disclosing the innovation to C, free of charge. As suggested by Anton and Yao, even after disclosing the innovation to C, RU
will still be able to extract some surplus from C by threatening to dis41
close the innovation to C’s competitors, as in the integration case.
Under the nonintegration option, RU initially controls access to the
innovation, but it will choose to relinquish control. And since this loss
of control is anticipated ex ante, the initial allocation of control to RU
is meaningless. The parties’ incentives to invest will be determined
only by the value of the innovation to C, by the cost to C of RU’s making good on its threat to disclose the innovation to others, and by the
42
parties’ relative bargaining power.
This result implies that organizational structure is irrelevant when
property rights innovation can be organized only through access con-

39

Models applying the property rights theory, such as the A-T model, generally
focus on ex ante efficiency and thus assume frictionless ex post bargaining under conditions of symmetric information. See HART, supra note 1, at 34, 38. The secrecy
forced by the absence of property rights renders this assumption inapplicable. Bargaining under asymmetric information suffers from well-known inefficiencies. At the
extreme, the market can completely unravel. Anton and Yao formally show how adverse selection leads to a “vanishingly small” payoff to the inventor when the inventor’s
wealth is limited. See Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 203.
(We follow Aghion and Tirole, supra note 2, at 1188, in assuming that RU has no initial
cash endowment.) But even if the extreme no-trade—and even no-negotiations—
outcome can be avoided, the parties will still expect a reduced ex post surplus and will
accordingly be more reluctant to invest ex ante.
40
See Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 195 (noting that
“an inventor who has made a difficult but valuable discovery can expect a significant
payoff . . . by freely revealing the invention”).
41
Id. at 195-96.
42
RU ’s threat to disclose in the integration case is identical to RU ’s threat to disclose in the nonintegration case. The resulting ex post wage adjustment affects the
expected payoffs and investment incentives in the same way. See generally Anton & Yao,
Start-Ups, supra note 6 (examining the incentives faced by an employer and an employee after the employee privately discovers a significant innovation).
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trol. This result, while serving as a useful benchmark, is not the end
of the story. The economics literature has devised several mechanisms
that would allow RU to secure a larger share of the ex post surplus if it
43
is awarded exclusive access to the innovation. First, the disclosure
paradox does not necessarily prevent trade. There are cases where RU
will choose to negotiate with C before disclosing the innovation despite the disclosure paradox—specifically when RU has significant ini44
45
tial wealth. Second, when RU can develop the innovation itself, C
can no longer assume that RU will disclose the innovation to it free of
charge and access becomes a source of power affecting the outcome
46
of the ex post bargaining between C and RU. Third, in some cases
RU can disclose only part of the innovation to C and then bargain with
43

Other ways in which RU may be able to extract some value from C, even absent
property rights in the innovation, have been discussed in the literature but are not discussed in this paper. See ARORA ET AL., supra note 2, at 116 (“[E]fficient contracts . . . can
be written by exploiting the complementarity between know-how and any other technology input that the licensor can use as a ‘hostage.’”); Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation, supra note 2, at 304 (discussing the importance of owning complementary assets
for extracting value from the innovation); Lynne G. Zucker et al., Commercializing Knowledge: University Science, Knowledge Capture, and Firm Performance in Biotechnology, in SCIENCE
AND CENTS: EXPLORING THE ECONOMICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 149, 151 ( John V. Duca &
Mine K. Yücel eds., 2002), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/pubs/
science/darby_zucker.pdf (detailing “the strong effects of academic science [in the form
of academic-to-industry technology transfers] on the success of firms”); Bruno Biais &
Enrico Perotti, Entrepreneurs and New Ideas 5 ( Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424601 (discussing how an “entrepreneur can take
advantage of the complementarity between the different dimensions of her innovative
idea, to mitigate the risk of idea stealing”). Also, in certain contexts innovators are driven
by nonpecuniary motives and are thus more willing to share ideas across firm boundaries.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 14 (2001) (arguing for the essential importance of free resources); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 374 (2002) (suggesting “characteristics that make large-scale collaborations . . . sustainable and productive in the digitally networked environment without reliance either on markets or managerial hierarchy”). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, reputation—either of the research unit or of the customer—can overcome the
disclosure paradox.
44
See Anton & Yao, Expropriation and Inventions, supra note 6, at 191 (arguing that
an inventor is willing to negotiate when she has “large financial resources”).
45
See Anton & Yao, Start-Ups, supra note 6, at 362 (discussing an employee’s option, upon making a discovery, to leave his firm and form a start-up); Gans & Stern,
supra note 6, at 336 (discussing how “a start-up innovator . . . launch[es] its product
independently”).
46
Gans and Stern refer to this option as “[p]rofiting from innovation through the
market for ideas” and discuss “negotiations . . . in the shadow of potential product market
competition.” Gans & Stern, supra note 6, at 336-37. Seventy-one percent of the firms
included in the Inc. 500 (a list of young, fast-growing firms) were founded by people who
“replicated or modified an idea encountered through [their] previous employment.”
AMAR V. BHIDÉ, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF NEW BUSINESSES 54 (2000).
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C for a share of the surplus larger than what it could obtain after full
47
disclosure. Finally, in some cases RU can leverage access and force C
48
to sign an NDA.
In our benchmark irrelevance result ĮA = 1 – ½ × į regardless of
the organizational form. When access provides real power to RU unNInt
NInt
der nonintegration, D A < 1 – ½ × į = ĮA. We assume that D A > ½.
Int
Integration still implies D A = ĮA = 1 – ½ × į.
Lemma 1 summarizes the organization of innovation with and
without property rights as a function of the relative marginal efficiency of the parties’ investments.
Lemma 1: Three threshold values (ȕ1, ȕ2, ȕ3), satisfying ȕ1 < ȕ2
< ȕ3, divide the parameter range ȕ  [0, ), as follows:
(i) When the relative marginal efficiency of C’s investment
as compared to RU’s investment is sufficiently low—i.e., ȕ
 ȕ1—efficiency is maximized when the innovation is protected by property rights and these rights are allocated to
RU (nonintegration). Absent property rights, inefficiency
will be minimized by access-based nonintegration.
(ii) When the relative marginal efficiency of C’s investment as compared to RU’s investment is sufficiently large—
i.e., ȕ  ȕ3—efficiency is maximized when the innovation is
protected by property rights and these rights are allocated
to C (integration). Absent property rights, inefficiency will
be minimized by access-based integration.
(iii) When the relative marginal efficiency of C’s investment as compared to RU’s investment is between these two
extremes, efficiency is maximized by access-based organization structure. Specifically, access-based nonintegration
maximizes efficiency when ȕ  (ȕ1, ȕ2), and access-based integration maximizes efficiency when ȕ  [ȕ2, ȕ3).

47

See Anton & Yao, supra note 13, at 514 (discussing the phenomenon of partial
disclosure).
48
A legally enforceable NDA can be viewed as a substitute for property right protection—i.e., as an alternative mode of legal protection afforded to the innovation. See
infra subsection I.D.2. In essence, the viability of an NDA implies that the innovation is
contractible. Achieving contractibility is costly, perhaps prohibitively so. RU would
have to invest in detailed documentation of the innovation and C would have to invest
in detailed documentation of its stock of knowledge in a way that would enable the
execution of a nondisclosure agreement.
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These results are depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1
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The following proposition states the role of the law in determining the organization of innovation and describes the welfare consequences of a legal policy denying property rights in the innovation,
when the alternative to property-based organization is access-based
organization:
Proposition 1: When, in the absence of property rights, the organization of innovation is access-based, the legal policy denying property rights in the innovation will replace propertybased organization with inefficient access-based organization
when ȕ  ȕ1 and when ȕ  ȕ3. When ȕ  (ȕ1, ȕ3), this legal policy will have no effect, as long as the parties can effectively
avoid property rights and opt for access-based organization.
Part (iii) of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 imply that access-based
organization may be superior to property-based organization. This
does not imply any inefficiency in recognizing property rights in the
innovation, as long as the parties can waive these rights in the ex ante
contract—i.e., specify that neither party will obtain a property right
(e.g., no patent application will be filed). In some cases such a waiver
may be impractical or even legally unenforceable. In those cases, part
(iii) of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 provide a reason not to recognize
49
property rights in the innovation.

49

Alternatively, if we allow for stochastic property rights, as does, for example,
HART, supra note 1, at 86, then property rights again can only increase efficiency. But
stochastic property rights may also be legally unenforceable.
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2. Restraints on Employee Mobility
Another source of control derives from contractual restrictions on
employee mobility. We have thus far assumed that the innovation can
be readily disclosed to a competitor. This assumption captures one
set of cases. In other cases, the innovation cannot be readily conveyed
to a competitor. Rather, RU must actually work for the competitor or
physically relocate to the competitor’s plant and engage in hands-on
training of the competitor’s employees. This type of innovation is
sometimes referred to as “know-how.”
The know-how case introduces a new contractual possibility.
Since the physical movement of employees is verifiable, such movements can be contractually prevented. Indeed firms routinely ask
their employees to sign covenants not to compete, prohibiting the
employees from working for a competitor for a prescribed period of
time. Oliver Hart observed that in technology-intensive industries,
“[the firm’s] source of value may consist of as little as . . . a contract
50
that prohibits [the firm’s] workers from working for competitors.”
The property rights theory of the firm emphasizes control that
stems from ownership of nonhuman assets. This emphasis on non51
human assets is motivated by “the absence of slavery.” But as described above—and as recognized by Hart—contractual restrictions
on employee mobility do exist and can be an important source of con52
trol. Of course, the reach of these contractual restrictions and, correspondingly, the extent of control that they provide are not unlimited. And it is the law that sets the limits—limits that echo the slavery
53
concerns raised by Hart.

50

Id. at 57. Aghion and Tirole discuss trailer clauses, which are closely related to
CNCs, yet they retain the assumption that property rights in the innovation are legally
recognized. Aghion & Tirole, supra note 2, at 1199-1200.
51
HART, supra note 1, at 29.
52
Cf. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, Knowledge Disclosure, Patents, and Optimal Organization of Research and Development 4 (London Sch. of Econ., Suntory & Toyota Int’l Ctrs. for Econ. & Related Disciplines, Research Paper No. TE/2004/478,
2004), available at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/te/te478.pdf (describing a situation in
which a developing unit’s control over a research unit derives from an ex ante contract
providing the developing unit with a right to veto the research unit’s outside financing
choices).
53
A CNC is not a property right according to Hart’s basic definition. He defines
property rights as residual-control rights—“the right to decide all usages of the asset.”
HART, supra note 1, at 30. Hart correctly notes that this definition is “consistent with
the standard view of ownership [and property rights] adopted by lawyers.” Id. at 30
n.4. Nevertheless, Hart notes that a CNC may be the defining asset of R&D firms.
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A first-cut analysis maps CNCs to organizational structure as follows: integration obtains when C hires RU and secures control by having RU sign a CNC. Conversely, nonintegration obtains when RU does
not sign a CNC and remains free to relocate to another firm. But this
binary characterization is an oversimplification.
A CNC, in terms of the control that it affords to the customer, is a
54
continuous variable. CNCs can vary on several continuous dimensions—specifically, the size of the geographic area in which the employee cannot seek alternative employment and the time period in
which the employee is prevented from competing with the customer.
55
In the basic property rights theory of the firm, allocation of control is
discrete: a certain nonhuman asset is allocated either to one firm or
to another. Continuous allocation of control, as obtained through
56
CNCs, is less conducive to clear demarcation of firm boundaries.
Still, as Hart recognizes, a CNC can be the central asset defining a
technology-intensive firm, especially when the innovation is not afforded property right protection.
Extending the framework described in Section I.A, let V(e, E) denote the value of the innovation to C, if C’s competitors do not have
access to the innovation. If RU leaves C and starts working for C’s
competitor with her knowledge of the innovation, the value of the innovation to C is (1 – į) × V(e, E), where į  [0,1]. C can limit RU’s
ability to disclose the innovation by enjoining the employee from
working for C’s competitors. We capture this power through a parameter, Ș  [0, 1], that measures the strength of the CNC. With a
CNC, the value of the innovation to C is (1 – (1 – Ș) × į) × V(e, E). At
one extreme, Ș = 0, the CNC is powerless, and C loses the entire proportion į if RU relocates to C’s competitor: (1 – (1 – Ș) × į) × V(e, E) =
(1 – į) × V(e, E). At the other extreme, Ș = 1, the CNC is sufficiently
strong in terms of its geographic or temporal reach that C loses nothing from RU’s relocation to a firm outside the geographical boundary
54

Imperfect enforcement transforms the allocation of property rights from a discrete to a continuous decision. See, e.g., Arora & Merges, supra note 20, at 452-53 (discussing the effects of information spillovers on firms based on different levels of rights
protection); Rajan & Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy, supra note 7, at 826-28
(discussing the effects of better or worse enforcement on the nature of a firm). But,
unlike with CNCs, the continuous variable is not in the parties’ control (at least not
entirely; the parties can affect the probability of enforcement to some degree).
55
See, e.g., HART, supra note 1, ch. 2 (presenting the property rights model and
discussing how the theory influences organizational arrangements).
56
Imperfect enforcement of property rights can similarly transform a discrete allocation of property rights into a continuous allocation.
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of the CNC or after the term of the CNC expires: (1 – (1 – Ș) × į) ×
V(e, E) = V(e, E).
C’s expected payoff is (1 – ½ × (1 – Ș) × į) × V(e, E). RU’s expected payoff is ½ × (1 – Ș) × į × V(e, E). When the source of control
is a CNC, we have ĮCNC = 1 – ½ × (1 – Ș) × į.
The parties’ incentives to invest depend on the strength of the
CNC—i.e., on Ș. At one extreme, when Ș = 0, RU’s incentives are
strongest, but still weaker than her incentives under nonintegration in
the A-T model where the innovation is protected by property rights.
C’s incentives are weakest when Ș = 0, but they are still stronger than
the incentives generated under nonintegration in the A-T model:
NInt
ĮCNC |Ș = 0 = 1 – ½ × į > ½ = D P . At the other extreme, when Ș = 1,
RU’s incentives are weakest and C’s incentives are strongest. A Ș = 1
CNC precisely mimics the outcome obtained under integration in the
A-T model. A very powerful CNC provides as much control as a propInt
erty right: ĮCNC |Ș = 1 = 1 = D P .
Enter the law. The law imposes an upper bound, K  (0, 1), on
the strength of the CNC. A CNC with Ș > K will not be enforced.
When the marginal efficiency of C’s investment relative to that of RU’s
investment is sufficiently small, the legal constraint is not binding.
But when the marginal efficiency of C’s investment is large enough
relative to that of RU’s investment, the organizational structure as
characterized by the strength of the CNC will be determined by the
legal constraint K , rather than by the incentive considerations highlighted by the economic theory of the firm.
These results are summarized in Lemma 2, which describes the
organization of innovation with and without property rights as a function of the relative marginal efficiency of the parties’ investments.
Lemma 2: Two threshold values (ȕ1, ȕ2), satisfying ȕ1 < ȕ2, divide the parameter range ȕ  [0, ), as follows:
(i) When the relative marginal efficiency of C’s investment
as compared to RU’s investment is sufficiently low—i.e., ȕ 
ȕ1—efficiency is maximized when the innovation is protected by property rights and these rights are allocated to
RU (nonintegration). Absent property rights, inefficiency
will be minimized by a Ș = 0 CNC—i.e., the parties will not
sign a CNC.
(ii) When the relative marginal efficiency of C’s investment as compared to RU’s investment is sufficiently large—
i.e., ȕ  ȕ2—efficiency is maximized when the innovation is
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protected by property rights and these rights are allocated
to C (integration). Absent property rights, inefficiency will
be minimized by a Ș = K CNC—i.e., the parties will sign the
strongest enforceable CNC.
(iii) When the relative marginal efficiency of C’s investment as compared to RU’s investment is between these extremes—i.e., ȕ  (ȕ1, ȕ2)—efficiency is maximized by an optimally designed CNC with Ș  (0, K ].
These results are depicted in Figure 2. Figure 2 illustrates the
law’s dual role in shaping the organization of innovation. First, the
law determines whether property-based organization is possible. Second, the law determines the limits of CNC-based organization by imposing an upper bound on the strength of a CNC.
Figure 2
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The following proposition states the role of the law in determining the organization of innovation and describes the welfare consequences of a legal policy denying property rights in the innovation,
when the alternative to property-based organization is CNC-based
organization.
Proposition 2: When, in the absence of property rights, the organization of innovation is CNC based,
(i) The legal policy denying property rights in the innovation will replace property-based organization with inefficient CNC-based organization when ȕ  ȕ1 and when ȕ  ȕ2.
When ȕ  (ȕ1, ȕ2), this legal policy will have no effect if parties can waive property rights and will increase efficiency
otherwise.
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(ii) A legal policy imposing stricter limits on enforceable
CNCs—i.e., a lower K —reduces ȕ2 and thus increases the
inefficiency caused by the absence of property rights in the
broader ȕ  ȕ2 range and leads to a narrower ȕ  (ȕ1, ȕ2)
range where CNC-based organization is superior to property-based organization.
Part (iii) of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 imply that CNC-based or57
This
ganization may be superior to property-based organization.
does not imply any inefficiency in recognizing property rights in the
innovation, as long as the parties can waive these rights in the ex ante
contract—i.e., as long as parties can specify that neither party will obtain a property right and sign a CNC instead. In some cases such a
waiver may be impractical or even legally unenforceable. In those
cases, part (iii) of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 provide a reason not to
58
recognize property rights in the innovation.
II. THE LAW
A. Property or No Property
We have argued that the organization of innovation depends on
whether the innovation is legally protected. It is therefore important
to understand the details of the legal framework that determines
when innovation is afforded legal protection. We begin with patent
law, which affords property right protection to a certain class of innovations. We then proceed to survey other sources of legal protection.
Under these alternative sources, innovation can be protected at a level
below property right protection. Even this lesser protection may be

57

The parties cannot improve the outcome obtained under property-based organization by adding CNCs. CNCs are meaningless when the innovation is protected
by property rights. First consider the integration case, where the property right is allocated to C. CNCs are meaningless in this case, since the allocation of property rights
already provides C with maximal control. Next, consider the nonintegration case,
where the property right is allocated to the employee. Without a CNC, C ’s expected
payoff is ½ × V(e, E ) – E and the employee’s expected payoff is ½ × V(e, E ) – e. The
same payoffs are obtained with a CNC. When C makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer, the
CNC is irrelevant. And when the employee makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer she will
wield the superior power of the property right, again rendering the CNC meaningless.
58
Alternatively, if we allow for stochastic property rights, then property rights
again can only increase efficiency; stochastic property rights, however, may also be legally unenforceable. See supra note 49.
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sufficient to allow standard organization of innovation, or what we
have been referring to as property-based organization of innovation.
1. Patent Law
Patent law is the main legal field that governs innovation. Patent
law creates and protects property rights in innovative products, methods of operation, and processes. A patent grants patentees protection
59
for twenty years from the date on which the application is filed. Over
time, patent protection has expanded in scope to cover new subject
matters and in some cases even embryonic inventions. Recently, however, we have witnessed some scaling back of the scope of patent protection and the ease with which it can be obtained.
Protection under the Patent Act is not available to ideas per se.
The patent system is designed to reward inventors who transform the
60
idea underlying an invention into “something of utility.” To receive
a patent, an application must meet substantive and procedural re61
quirements specified in the statutory scheme. Specifically, it must
describe an invention that is useful, novel, and nonobvious to a per62
son skilled in the relevant art. Our patent law affords protection
only to manmade innovation, and not to natural or scientific facts. In
this spirit, courts have been wary of extending the scope of patents to
63
naturally occurring phenomena and basic scientific relationships.
Until recently, patent protection enjoyed a period of strengthening and expansion, notwithstanding a significant scholarly opposition
64
to this trend. This trend manifested itself in various aspects of patent
59

35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
See Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An “Idea”
Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 705, 716-17 (2006) (describing how ideas cannot per se receive protection since “[p]atents protect inventions, and inventions are a
discrete subset of ideas that have satisfied threshold . . . requirements”).
61
See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–376.
62
See id. §§ 101–103 (setting forth these general requirements).
63
See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948)
(holding that the patent sought was for a natural phenomenon and thus that the invention was not patentable); see also Michael Meehan, The Handiwork of Nature: Patentable Subject Matter and Laboratory Corporation v. Metabolite Labs, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 311, 312 (2006) (“Although the wording of the statute is broad, it is nonetheless
well established that mathematical algorithms, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas cannot be patented.”).
64
See, e.g., Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong
Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 281 (1998) (arguing that stronger patent protection may hinder rather than stimulate technological
and economic process). Mazzoleni and Nelson also provide additional references
60
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law, including the broadening of the definition of patentable subject
65
matter to include, among others, business-method patents, the encouraging of government-subsidized bodies (such as universities) to
66
claim patent protection, and the increasing tendency of the legal sys67
tem to uphold patents. As part of this trend, patent law has ex68
panded to tolerate even merely embryonic innovation. In In re Strahilevitz, for example, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals—the
precursor to the Federal Circuit—stated that an invention did not
have to be built or tested to receive a patent, nor did there have to be
69
a working model.
Patent law provides an impressive array of remedies to successful
plaintiffs, including injunctive relief, actual damages, treble damages
70
for willful infringement, and attorneys’ fees in exceptional cases.
Recently, we have witnessed a certain retraction from the expansive trend that swept through the patent world. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit raised the patentability bar and narrowed the scope of protection. In 2007, in
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a licensee can seek a declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid without
71
first terminating or giving up the license. This part of the ruling
overturned the Federal Circuit’s rule that the existence of a license

supporting this academic trend opposing the expansion of patent protection. See id. at
282-84.
65
See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasizing the broad statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
find a business method patentable), abrogated on other grounds by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
66
See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 614-15 (2008) (noting and discussing the rise of university
patenting).
67
This tendency is mainly due to the establishment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982. See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 64, at 274
(“From 1982 through 1987, 89% of the district court decisions of patent validity have
been upheld by the [Federal Circuit], up from 30% prior to [its] creation . . . .”).
68
See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439,
445 (2004) (“Policies that permit patenting of embryonic research results—that is, that
allow patenting prior to the bulk of the investment needed to bring the innovation to
market—increase the efficiency of the competition . . . .”).
69
668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (“We recognize that working examples are
desirable in complex technologies . . . [but] examples are not required . . . .”).
70
See Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1477, 1511-13 (2005) (comparing the potential remedies available under patent
law with those available under contract law).
71
127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007).
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agreement categorically eliminated “apprehension of suit” by the li72
censee. Furthermore, in a footnote, the Supreme Court called into
question the entirety of the Federal Circuit’s declaratory-judgment
73
jurisprudence.
In another 2007 decision, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid construction of the “teaching, suggestion, motivation” test employed to
74
determine the obviousness of new inventions. The Court emphasized the need for a flexible, common-sense approach to obviousness
75
that takes account of motivations implicit in the prior art. An important implication of the Court’s ruling is that it will make it harder to
secure—and easier to invalidate—patents.
The Federal Circuit, for its part, issued two important decisions
concerning patentable subject matter. First, in 2007, the Federal Circuit decided in In re Nuijten that a signal cannot be patented since it is
76
not a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
Second, in October 2008, the Federal Circuit’s nine-to-three en banc
decision in In re Bilski refused to accord protection to a process of
hedging risks in commodity trading, stating that to be patentable a
process must be connected to a machine or apparatus or must “trans77
form[] a particular article into a different state or thing.” This decision limits the applicability of patent protection to certain business
methods and processes and may portend a more restrictive construction of patentable subject matter more generally.
78
Finally, in In re Ferguson, the Federal Circuit held that a method
for marketing software and other products via shared marketing force
cannot be patented as it does not constitute a patentable subject matter. The court reaffirmed its holding in In re Bilski, stating that “the
Supreme Court’s machine-or-transformation test is the ‘definitive test
to determine whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to
encompass only a particular application of a fundamental principle

72

See Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774 n.11 (“The [Federal Circuit’s] reasonableapprehension-of-suit test . . . conflicts with our decisions . . . .”).
74
See 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007) (finding the Federal Circuit’s test too narrow
and inconsistent with precedent).
75
Id.
76
500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 172 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2008).
77
545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, No. 080964, 2009 WL 221232 ( June 1, 2009).
78
558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
73
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79

rather than to pre-empt the principle itself.’” The court, then, explained that since the applicant’s method is neither tied to any machine
or apparatus, nor transforms an article into a different shape or thing,
80
it fails to “meet either prong of the machine-or-transformation test.”
2. Trade Secret Law
Trade secret law originated from the fields of torts, contracts, and
81
equitable claims, rather than property. To date, it remains controversial whether trade secrets enjoy property status. Traditionally,
courts did not treat trade secrets as property rights. Yet in the last few
82
decades, the courts have reversed course. The change was motivated
in part by the property-like characteristics of trade secrets (such as assignability) and in part by the courts’ desire to strengthen incentives
83
to innovate. Nevertheless, several commentators disagree with the
new approach and argue that trade secrets constitute at best quasi
84
property or incomplete property rights.
Indeed, trade secrets lack some of the defining characteristics of
property rights. Trade secrets do not bestow upon their holder an in
rem right (that is, a right that avails against the rest of the world);
rather, trade secrets arise in the bilateral context of confidentiality du-

79

Id. at 1363 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
Id.
81
See Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 9 (2004)
(describing the “complex pedigree” of trade secrecy).
82
Compare E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102
(1917) (“[T]he starting point for the present matter is not property . . . [but the defendant’s] confidential relations with the plaintiffs . . . .”), and RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757 cmt. a (1939) (“[T]he protection is afforded only by a general duty of good
faith . . . .”), with Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (“Trade secrets have many of the characteristics of more tangible forms of property.”), and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-85 (1974) (“[T]he encouragement of
invention [is] the broadly stated polic[y] behind trade secret law.”).
83
See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 38 (4th ed. 2006) (“Treatment of trade secrets as property rights . . . is
consistent with a view of trade secrets law as providing an additional incentive to innovate . . . .”); see also Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365,
366 (1989) (discussing how “two recent . . . decisions classified information as private
property”).
84
See, e.g., Burk & McDonnell, supra note 23, at 603 (“[T]rade secrets . . . lacking
the right to exclude, cannot properly be considered property rights at all.”); Burk, supra note 81, at 11 (“[T]rade secrecy does not confer a property right, or at best it confers an incomplete property right.”).
80
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ties. Furthermore, trade secrets do not confer exclusivity upon their
holder; a trade secret may be held by multiple holders at the same time.
Despite their weak proprietary status, the protection afforded to
trade secrets is broad and strong, and if misappropriation of a trade
secret can be proven, a variety of remedies becomes available to the
holder, including injunctive relief and damages. The Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, which has been adopted generally by the majority of ju85
risdictions, defines trade secrets broadly to encompass any
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum86
stances to maintain its secrecy.

The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines a trade
secret broadly as well. Under the Restatement, the term includes “any
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other
enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an ac87
tual or potential economic advantage over others.”
The broad definition of trade secrets implies that various types of
commercially valuable information and business concepts that cannot
be patented can easily be protected as trade secrets. It is clear, for example, that inchoate inventions, consumer lists, minimally innovative
processes and methods, and “negative information”—that is, information about failed experiments, products, and methods—all come
within the definition of trade secrets so long as they accrue economic
value to the owner. Yet not all valuable information can be claimed
under trade secret law. In order to be protected, information must be
confidential and its holder must adopt reasonable measures to ensure
its secrecy. Information that is either generally known or ascertainable to the market cannot be claimed as a trade secret.

85

It has been adopted by forty states, while the rest continue to apply the common
law or separate state statutes. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39
statutory note at 437-38 (1995).
86
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537-38 (2005).
87
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). The Restatement
also expands the remedies provided in the course of trade secrets protection. See id.
§§ 44–45 (providing for injunctive and monetary relief).
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In addition, a trade secret does not confer exclusivity in the subject
matter of the secret, as the law does not protect against reverse engi88
neering or independent discovery of the trade secret. The inventor
remains vulnerable to such measures and may absorb a resulting decrease in the attractiveness of the information to prospective assignees.
On first impression, it also seems that trade secrecy constitutes a
very strong form of protection. But this impression is incorrect; the
89
protection is less effective than it first appears. The main practical
shortcoming of trade secret law is that it is difficult to prevail in an ac90
tion for misappropriation of trade secrets.
First, as noted above, trade secret protection is limited to the context of confidentiality duties, such as employment relationships or
business partnerships. As a result, trade secret disputes typically arise
in cases where a former employee or business partner is purported to
have used confidential information or in the aftermath of failed nego91
tiations. In fact, concern for former employers’ interests was among
92
the main reasons for recognizing trade secret protection.
Second, it is usually difficult to substantiate a misappropriation
claim in court. Proving misappropriation of trade secrets requires a
showing that the information could not be obtained from any other
93
source. In clear cases, of course, trade secret protection does have
bite. Such cases may involve theft or industrial espionage by a com94
petitor or appropriation of physical documents by former employees.
Yet most cases involve considerable cost and uncertainty, a fact that
88

Burk & McDonnell, supra note 23, at 600 (citing UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1
cmt., 14 U.L.A 538).
89
See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 600 (1999)
(“[I]t remains the case that [trade secret] protection is limited . . . .”).
90
See Anton & Yao, Start-Ups, supra note 6, at 363 (“In practice, detection is problematic and court challenges . . . are difficult to win.”); Gilson, supra note 89, at 598600 (discussing barriers to legal victories in trade secret litigation).
91
See, e.g., Celeritas Techs. Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (arising from a manufacturer’s alleged breach of an NDA between it and an inventor); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 468 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Minn.
1979) (arising from a failed business relationship).
92
See generally MERGES ET AL., supra note 83, at 80-82 (discussing issues relating to
departing employees and their former employers).
93
Merges, supra note 70, at 28-29 (illustrating the difficulty of proving misappropriation under On-Line Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GMBH, 386 F.3d
1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
94
See, e.g., Alan Hyde, Silicon Valley High Velocity Labor Market, 11 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN., Summer 1998, at 27, 31-32 (describing an investigation of suspected corporate
theft by a former employee of Intel).
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weighs against bringing a lawsuit in the first place. Furthermore, in
certain industrial environments, such as Silicon Valley, where the culture supports free movement of employees, firms that sue for misap95
propriation of trade secrets may incur reputational penalties.
The secrecy requirement of trade secret protection thus detracts
from the practical value of this form of legal protection by making it
difficult to sell and license trade secrets to third parties. This problem
is especially acute when the protected information needs to be disclosed in the precontractual stage of business negotiations. There are,
of course, legal mechanisms designed to address this problem. Chief
among those are NDAs that oblige the disclosee to refrain from disclosing confidential information. Powerful parties, however, often refuse to sign NDAs and instead demand that the disclosing party sign a
legal document that releases the powerful party from all liability if the
information is somehow disclosed. Even when an NDA is signed, its
enforcement involves major evidentiary problems, owing in part to the
complexity of defining the information and separating it from preex96
isting knowledge.
In addition to the disincentive to enter negotiations faced by the
disclosing party, the disclosee is disincentivized by the fewer rights
that she receives. As discussed above, the disclosee cannot be guaranteed exclusivity (because of, for example, independent development
97
or reverse engineering by a third party). More generally, they cannot be provided with true residual control, and any contractual attempt to include it will be both incomplete and expensive, sometimes
98
prohibitively so. Patent protection makes it much easier to transfer
the protected information relative to trade secret protection.

95

See Gilson, supra note 89, at 601 (discussing how firms “risk[] the imposition of
labor market-imposed reputation penalties”); Hyde, supra note 94, at 32 (noting that
“Intel acquired a reputation for being a bully towards its own employees, and may have
paid for it” as potential employees “constantly asked . . . if they too would be sued if . . .
they would someday leave the company”).
96
Arora & Merges, supra note 20, at 461.
97
See supra text accompanying note 88.
98
See Merges, supra note 70, at 7-9 (discussing costs associated with contractual
protections).
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3. Copyright Law
Although copyright protection does not extend to “any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
99
or discovery,” it has a role in encouraging and protecting innovation.
A substantial advantage of the copyright regime is that protection
attaches at the moment that the work is “fixed in any tangible me100
dium.”
This attachment mechanism is unlike that of patent and
trade secret law, which are dependent upon time- (and money-) consuming processes, such as filing applications or negotiating contracts.
The copyright regime entitles a copyright owner only to the rights
that are explicitly mentioned in the Copyright Act, and only for a lim101
ited time, as opposed to the full residual right associated with a
property right. With regard to these rights, the copyright regime car102
ries property-like characteristics such as exclusivity and injunctive
103
remedies.
These characteristics, however, exist alongside considerable nonproperty features that limit their reach, such as compulsory104
licensing schemes and exemptions like the fair use doctrine (which
105
essentially constitutes a compulsory license at zero royalties).
Consequently, copyright protection is less strong than the protection provided by the patent regime, which is largely free of broad exemptions
and exceptions.
Moreover, the routes for permissible appropriation of a trade secret are available in copyright law as well. Like trade secret law, copyright law does not protect the creator from independent creation of

99

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (“[N]o author may copyright facts or ideas.”).
100
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
101
See id. §§ 106, 302 (enumerating rights of copyright holders and their duration). In fact, however, commentators point towards an expansion of the copyright
regime, stretching to an all-purpose, general-use right with no effective time limitation.
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Creative Reading, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 175,
183 (“[W]e need to remember that copyright was never intended to be a general-use
right. Rather, Congress designed the statutory copyright as a collection of enumerated, individually bounded, exclusive rights.”).
102
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (enumerating the “exclusive rights” of the copyright
owner).
103
See id. § 502(a) (authorizing injunctive remedies).
104
Compulsory licenses are area specific. See, e.g., id. § 114(d)(2) (providing
compulsory licenses for digital transmissions of sound recordings); id. § 115 (providing
compulsory licenses for “cover” music).
105
See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 158-60 (2000) (discussing
how fair use may be considered a compulsory-licensing scheme).
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106

an identical work.
Similarly, in the area of computer software, a
107
copyrighted work is vulnerable to reverse engineering.
Indeed,
courts have established the lawfulness of intermediate copying and
decompilation of computer software when it is intended to extract
public domain elements and develop interoperable or competing
108
products.
In addition, copyright law occupies an intermediate position between the disclosure regimes of patents and trade secrecy. On the
one hand, copyright protection is not conditioned upon publication,
as patent protection is rare, but on the other hand, it does require
fixation in a tangible medium of expression. Moreover, publication
may prove to be rewarding in the evidentiary structure of copyrights
because it creates a presumption that a later similar work was copied
109
rather than independently created.
Copyright law incorporates the “work made for hire” doctrine,
which vests in employers copyrights in original works made by their
110
While this doctrine increases certainty to some degree,
employees.
its boundaries are blurry because of the practical difficulty that some106

See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.
1936) (“[B]ut if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew
Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author’ . . . .”).
107
Reverse engineering constitutes infringement in other areas of copyright law
when it involves so-called “intermediate copying.” See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518-28 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that intermediate copying
of computer code is infringement, but finding it protected fair use in this case);
Walker v. Univ. Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding intermediate
copying of blueprints to be infringement); Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628
F. Supp. 871, 876 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that intermediate copying of story boards
and scripts was infringement).
108
See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602-03
(9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that where copying is necessary to access functional elements, it constitutes fair use); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d
832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding Atari’s noncommercial reverse engineering to be
fair use); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse Engineering and Professor Miller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 975, 993 (1994) (suggesting that the
object-code exception to copyright exists to limit copyright’s strength and breadth);
J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies: The United States Experience in a
Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6, 143-44 (1989) (“[B]y encouraging third
parties to make free and abundant use of nonprotectable matter underlying the protected expression, copyright laws foster a built-in process of ‘reverse engineering’ that
enables many copyrightable works to cluster around common themes or ideas.”).
109
See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d
Cir. 1983) (noting that the widespread dissemination of the allegedly copied work
could support a finding of access to it); Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683 (2003).
110
See 17 U.S.C § 101 (2006) (defining, among other things, “work made for hire”).
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times arises in discerning the distinction between employees and
111
contractors.
Copyright law affords rights holders a wide array of remedies, including injunctions, actual and statutory damages, disgorgement of an
infringer’s profits, and impoundment and destruction of infringing
112
articles.
In sum, then, it can be said that copyright law encourages disclosure of commercially valuable information, but not nearly as much as
patent law does. Relative to trade secrecy, copyright protection allows greater employee mobility and permits interfirm transactions,
and it avoids the problems associated with these goals in the trade secret regime resulting from the undisclosed nature of the information
113
in that area.
4. The Law of Ideas
It is important to note at the outset that there is no federal body
of law specifically designed to provide direct legal protection to ideas.
114
As far as
Thus, state law will be the focal point of this discussion.
state law is concerned, protection for ideas was historically left to the
courts and was developed by a process of accretion. A review of the
case law reveals that courts have applied various common law doctrines on an ad hoc basis to afford protection to ideas in certain situations. These efforts resulted in a largely inconsistent and incoherent
115
body of law.

111

See Barak Y. Orbach, The Law and Economics of Hired Creativity: Who Should
Own the Rights? 46-47 (Oct. 27, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/workshops/Documents/Fall20
03/orbach.pdf (“[M]uch of the discussion . . . under copyright law . . . is focused on
the evasive . . . distinction between employees and independent contractors.”).
112
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505, 509.
113
See Burk, supra note 81, at 9 (“Resolving trade secrecy disputes is especially
problematic in the case of employee departure, as courts are reluctant to curtail the mobility of labor.”); see also Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1302-07 (1996) (discussing intellectual property regimes from both liability-rule and property-rule perspectives).
114
See generally Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 270 (Cal. 1956) (en banc) (using
implied contracts to protect ideas from disclosure and misappropriation); Bristol v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 30 N.E. 506, 507 (N.Y. 1892) (applying New York law
of ideas); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 459-60 (1868) (“In this court, it is settled
that a secret art is a legal subject of property . . . .”).
115
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 60, at 731 (noting that these common law doctrines
resemble federal patent and copyright requirements but concluding that “their application in idea law is misguided”).
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The starting point for these judicial efforts has usually been that
116
ideas do not deserve property protection. Therefore, plaintiffs were
forced to rely on other doctrines, such as contracts, quasi-contracts,
confidential relationships, and unjust enrichment to prove their
117
118
Typically, they did not prevail. The courts’ reluctance to
claims.
protect pure ideas was driven both by a desire to prevent the monopolization of ideas and by a concern about the evidentiary and adminis119
trative difficulties associated with such protection.
Although state laws concerning protection of ideas are ambiguous
and therefore difficult to classify and analyze, it is possible to discern
120
two threshold parameters that ideas must satisfy to win protection.
The first is concreteness: to be protected, an idea must be concrete
121
and not merely abstract.
The second is its novelty, sometimes ad122
dressed as “originality,” meaning that the idea is beyond the general
123
knowledge in the field.
The requirement of concreteness is vague, and it varies among jurisdictions. Some courts have required ideas to be both reduced to a

116

See id. (noting judicial reluctance to allow compensation for misappropriation of
ideas); see also Larissa Katz, A Powers-Based Approach to the Protection of Ideas, 23 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 706 (2006) (“We cannot look to property theory to uncover the
source of the duty not to use or disclose another’s idea shared in confidence for the simple reason that idea-submission law concerns a more limited or in personam rights-duty
relationship than the in rem rights-duty relationship that property law describes.”).
117
See Katz, supra note 116, at 706-15 (detailing the various approaches); Miller,
supra note 60, at 764-73 (same).
118
See Miller, supra note 60, at 731.
119
See id. at 720 (discussing these “two core concerns underlying the courts’ reluctance to recognize a protectable interest in ideas”).
120
But see Katz, supra note 116, at 692 (noting four prerequisites: novelty, originality, confidentiality, and concreteness). This different classification is largely semantic,
but it does demonstrate the courts’ inconsistency.
121
See, e.g., Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212 (App. Div.
1940) (“[O]wing to the difficulties of enforcing such rights, the courts have uniformly
refused to assume to protect property in ideas that have not been reduced to a concrete form.”); Williamson v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 16 N.Y.S.2d 217, 217-18 (App. Div.
1939) (per curiam) (“Plaintiff’s idea never took on concrete form at the time of disclosure so as to give rise to a property right . . . .”); Alberts v. Remington Rand, Inc., 23
N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (“Only where the idea has been reduced to concrete
form prior to its disclosure to and appropriation by the defendant may recovery be had
upon an implied contract.”).
122
Miller, supra note 60, at 726.
123
For a view that criticizes these standards and offers an alternative framework,
see id. at 731-32.
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124

tangible form and highly detailed and developed, while others have
125
only adhered to the first requirement of tangibility.
Courts’ inter126
pretations of the novelty requirement also vary across jurisdictions.
Most jurisdictions strictly require that an idea be absolutely and objectively novel—meaning unknown in the field in general—in order to
receive protection. New York, in contrast, is more flexible. The
courts in New York require that the idea be novel only to the recipient
when a confidentiality or nondisclosure contract is signed between the
127
parties prior to disclosure. Moreover, postdisclosure agreements are
128
enforceable in New York regardless of the novelty of the idea.
In
the absence of a formal contract between the parties, however, when
the misappropriation claim is predicated on theories of quasi-contract
or breach of a confidential relationship, the New York courts reintroduced the strict novelty standard, requiring the plaintiff to prove that
129
her idea is novel in absolute and objective terms. The novelty stan-

124

See, e.g., Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663, 665 (Nev. 1975) (“An idea in order to meet the test of concreteness must be ready for immediate use without any additional embellishment.”).
125
See, e.g., Flemming v. Ronson Corp., 258 A.2d 153, 156 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1969) (“The concept submitted by [plaintiff] is not an abstract one in the sense that it
is incapable of physical form. Rudimentary as it is, the idea can be transformed into a
product. It is, to that extent, concrete and usable.”), aff’d, 275 A.2d 759 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1971). Professor Miller criticizes requiring tangibility as anachronistic,
especially in light of the development of intangible injuries, assets, and concepts in
other fields of the law. See Miller, supra note 60, at 724.
126
See Katz, supra note 116, at 693 (noting that across jurisdictions, there is a lack
of clarity on how to assess and distinguish novelty criteria); Mary LaFrance, Something
Borrowed, Something New: The Changing Role of Novelty in Idea Protection Law, 34 SETON
HALL L. REV. 485, 485-86 (2004) (noting that “[i]dea protection doctrine . . . differs
primarily in the role played by the concept of ‘novelty’” and noting that “[t]here is no
one authoritative definition of novelty in this context”).
127
See LaFrance, supra note 126, at 486 (discussing New York’s novelty requirements).
128
See Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1098 (N.Y. 1993)
(“The law of contracts would have to be substantially rewritten were we to allow buyers
of fully disclosed ideas to disregard their obligation to pay simply because an idea
could have been obtained from some other source or in some other way.”); see also LaFrance, supra note 126, at 486 (“New York requires some form of novelty as a prerequisite to all forms of idea protection other than post-disclosure contracts.”).
129
See Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 380 (2d Cir. 2000)
(“[M]isappropriation claims require that the idea at issue be original and novel in absolute terms. This is so because unoriginal, known ideas have no value as property and
the law does not protect against the use of that which is free and available to all.”); see
also LaFrance, supra note 126, at 492-95 (summarizing the Nadel decision and its
implications).
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dard with respect to suits based on a theory of unjust enrichment re130
mains unclear in New York and is subject to scholarly debate.
California law takes a more liberal approach to the novelty re131
quirement in cases of predisclosure agreements, an approach that
132
In California, the question of
has been followed by other states.
novelty has taken on an evidentiary nature; it is treated as evidence of
contractual consideration rather than as a necessary element.
The New Jersey courts are quite vague on the subject, and the case
133
law does not provide clear guidance on the novelty requirement.
Professor Miller has argued that the application of the concreteness and novelty parameters bars protection to the vast majority of
134
Thus, according to Miller, as far as the legal protection of
ideas.
ideas is concerned, current state protection does not represent a ma135
jor improvement over the nonexistent federal protection.

130

Compare LaFrance, supra note 126, at 486 (“For an idea to be protected under
unjust enrichment/quasi-contract, however, the idea must be novel in the general or
absolute sense—in other words, unknown not only to the buyer but also to the public
in general.”), with Katz, supra note 116, at 695-96 (“For unjust enrichment claims in
New York and California, a plaintiff need only establish that the idea was novel to the
defendant, rather than generally or objectively novel.”).
131
See Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1966) (“An idea which can be the subject matter of a contract need not be
novel . . . .”); LaFrance, supra note 126, at 486 (noting that novelty is not required for
ideas disclosed pursuant to an express or implied-in-fact contract in California);
Ronald Caswell, Comment, A Comparison and Critique of Idea Protection in California, New
York, and Great Britain, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 717, 723 (1992) (“Under California’s [quasi-contract] analysis, it is irrelevant whether an idea contains the element
of novelty.”).
132
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 461-63 (6th Cir. 2001) (predicting that Michigan courts would follow the California approach); Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 926 P.2d 1130, 1141 (Alaska 1996) (adopting the California approach).
133
The leading novelty case in New Jersey, Flemming v. Ronson Corp., 258 A.2d 153,
156-57 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969), aff’d, 275 A.2d 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1971), favors no novelty prerequisite in the contractual framework. The recent case of
Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 788 A.2d 906, 914-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002),
cert. granted and summarily remanded, 796 A.2d 893 (N.J. 2002), deviated from Flemming and
demonstrated a willingness to adopt such a novelty standard. Johnson, however, has since
been remanded (in light of the plaintiff ’s receipt of a patent) and thus no longer represents controlling law. Hence, the New Jersey courts have an opportunity to reconsider
the issue. See LaFrance, supra note 126, at 486-87 (suggesting that New Jersey courts take
this opportunity to “carve out a more thoughtful approach” to idea law).
134
Miller, supra note 60, at 730-32.
135
See id. (summarizing the overarching problems with the current state of idealaw doctrine). Professor Miller believes that because of the modern significance of
ideas for a wide range of businesses and industries, the law should grant greater protection to ideas, especially in light of the need to stay competitive in a global market
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5. Summary
Thus far, we have reviewed the various federal and state bodies of
law that pertain to innovation. In theory, patent protection offers the
strongest protection by affording exclusivity against the rest of the
world, including inventors who independently come up with the pro136
tected invention, for a period of twenty years from the date of filing.
The expense and difficulty associated with securing and enforcing patent protection, however, undermine the effectiveness of patent protection for many inventions. Moreover, recent developments have narrowed the range of innovations that are eligible for patent protection.
Trade secrecy is another important source of legal protection for
137
innovation. The subject matter of trade secret law is much broader
than the subject matter of patent law, but the protection provided by
trade secret law is weaker than patent protection. Although in principle trade secret law covers all types of information, one cannot rely on
trade secrecy with respect to information that may be readily discerned from the design of products and processes and information
that may be extracted via reverse engineering. Furthermore, while
trade secret law purports to protect the employer’s tacit information,
in reality employers who seek to assert their rights against former employees are rarely successful, except in evident cases involving actual
appropriation of documents by the employee.
Copyright law also affords some protection to innovation, albeit
138
Copyright protection is limited to the expression of inindirectly.
novation, rather than the innovation itself, and it is subject to some
broad exceptions and exemptions that may adversely affect the innovator. The work-made-for-hire doctrine in copyright law protects employers to some extent against disclosure by ex-employees concerning
the employee innovation. But since copyright protection does not extend to ideas and concepts, and only to the expression thereof, the
protection that it affords to former employers is very limited when the
idea or concept may be expressed in multiple ways.
Naked ideas are offered a very minimal level of protection in our
139
legal system. Such ideas cannot be protected under patent or copy-

that creates alternative markets for ideas for American and foreign idea vendors. See
id. at 705-06.
136
See supra subsection II.A.1.
137
See supra subsection II.A.2.
138
See supra subsection II.A.3.
139
See supra subsection II.A.4.
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right law. They enjoy a certain degree of protection under trade secret law, as well as under certain state law doctrines providing direct
protection to ideas.
B. Indirect Protection of Innovation: CNCs
As explained above, the direct legal protection afforded to innova140
tion is limited.
In the employment context, these limited direct
modes of protection are supplemented by indirect modes of protection: employers rely on legal doctrines that protect information by restraining departing employees from using knowledge obtained at
their firms. These doctrines include, among others, breach of a duty
of loyalty, unfair competition, breach of nondisclosure agreements,
and, most importantly, covenants not to compete.
Covenants not to compete forbid an employee from competing
with an employer for a certain period of time after the termination of
employment, typically one or two years, within a limited geographic
area related to the employer’s market. By restricting employee mobility, such covenants limit knowledge spillovers and indirectly protect
employers’ information.
In most states, covenants not to compete are enforceable if they are
141
not unreasonable and excessive in duration or geographical scope.
The importance of covenants not to compete is growing, as more and
142
more employees are required to sign them.
Lawsuits for breach of
covenants not to compete have become common and are currently
143
among the most frequently litigated issues in employment law.
Historically, courts were reluctant to enforce covenants not to
compete because of the disparities in bargaining power between employers and employees, as well as the effect that the covenants have on
employees’ ability to make a living. Likewise, courts were concerned

140

See supra Section II.A.
See Hyde, supra note 94, at 30.
142
See Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 738-39 (2002) (“Covenants
not to compete and covenants not to disclose information have become commonplace
in employment contracts over the past ten years. In addition to their increased presence in negotiated, fixed-term employment contracts, such covenants have also been
inserted into at-will employment relationships.”).
143
See id. at 739 (tracking the increase of litigation involving covenants not to
compete in decisions available on Westlaw).
141
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about the adverse effects of CNCs on employee mobility, the labor
144
market, and trade in general.
Over time, however, courts warmed to CNCs and adopted a “rule
of reason” approach to their enforcement. Under this standard,
courts enforce CNCs of reasonable duration and geographic coverage,
as they neither constrain employee mobility beyond what is necessary
to protect the employer’s legitimate business interests nor contradict
the public interest. The definition of reasonableness varies among
states and between cases.
Traditionally, courts applied a higher level of scrutiny to CNCs in
at-will employment relationships. Courts employed various tests to ensure that employees who could be terminated at will had received
valid consideration in return for signing the covenant not to com145
pete. This higher standard of review in cases involving termination
at will has largely eroded in recent years. And while there are still
courts that decline to enforce covenants not to compete in cases of
unjustified dismissal, ignoring the at-will clause, other courts readily
146
enforce them even in such cases.
It is noteworthy that the courts have contributed to the widespread use of CNCs by developing a practice of rewriting invalid covenants and then enforcing the modified terms, rather than rejecting
147
the entire covenant as courts did in the past. Over time, courts have
also expanded the list of employer interests that justified enforcement
of covenants not to compete. In the past, CNCs were only enforced if
a trade secret of the employer was at stake; today, many courts have
148
For example, in most states, courts
abandoned that requirement.
regularly enforce CNCs to protect a former employer’s customer list,
149
even if the list is not secret. Similarly, courts have recently enforced
covenants not to compete in cases where the employer paid for an
employee’s training on the ground that the employer is entitled to
prevent the employee from using the skills that she acquired in the
144

See id. at 740.
See id. at 742 (explaining that one test is whether the CNC is “ancillary to an
otherwise valid transaction”).
146
See id. at 743-44 (discussing the various courts’ responses to CNCs in cases of
unjustified dismissal).
147
See id. at 744 (“The current approach of a majority of courts is either to rewrite
an invalid covenant and enforce it as rewritten or to delete the invalid portions and
enforce the remainder.”).
148
See id. at 747 (noting this expansion and the elimination of the trade secret
requirement).
149
See id. at 749.
145
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training while employed by a competitor, even though no trade se150
crets were disclosed to the trainee.
An important exception to the modern trend of enforcing CNCs
is California. California law provides that “every contract by which
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or
151
The courts have interbusiness of any kind is to that extent void.”
152
preted this law broadly to invalidate CNCs.
Professor Gilson has argued that California’s reluctance to enforce CNCs accounts for the rise of Silicon Valley relative to high-tech
153
centers in other states, such as Route 128 in Massachusetts. Professor Gilson explained that the unenforceability of CNCs led to knowledge spillovers and information sharing, which generated considerable agglomeration effects and increased the innovative capacity of
154
the high technology sector.
CONCLUSION
The organization of innovation can be based on property rights,
on verifiable contractual provisions (CNCs), on access that is controlled or limited by law (trespass) or technology, and on reputation.
In this Article, we have focused on the first three organizational forms.
Specifically, we analyzed how the availability and scope of different
kinds of legal protection to innovation delineates the boundary between firm and market in the high-tech industry.
Although we did not engage in an in-depth analysis of reputationbased organization of innovation, we recognize this possibility and its
importance. As Professors Burk and McDonnell warned, one must be
cautious not to overstate the role of property rights or forms of legal
protection in business settings, since nonlegal mechanisms, such as
business norms, expectations, and reputation, play a significant role in
155
such environments. We agree.
Reputation can be an effective substitute for organization, and it
can cure problems of uncontractability. For example, many of the

150

See id. at 751 (discussing the courts’ recent focus on “who pays” for the training
as a justification for enforcing CNCs in such circumstances).
151
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16,600 (West 2008).
152
See Hyde, supra note 94, at 29-30 (observing that CNCs have been unenforceable in California for over a century because of this statute).
153
Gilson, supra note 89, at 578.
154
Id. at 578-79.
155
Burk & McDonnell, supra note 23, at 602.
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contracting challenges that we discussed will not arise if buyers or financiers of innovation have a strong reputation for not stealing others’ ideas. Likewise, a research unit famous for its innovative capabilities may be able to secure financing for its projects even without fully
disclosing them to financiers—or at the very least, may get the latter to
sign an NDA. Correspondingly, an employer who establishes for herself a reputation for generously rewarding employees for innovation
will be spared many of the contracting problems that we addressed.
Perhaps the best example of the significance of reputation is provided
156
Venture-capital firms with established
by venture-capital firms.
reputations can (and do) assuage Arrow’s disclosure paradox. Thanks
to their reputation, such firms can on many occasions gain access to
unprotected information generated by innovators.
The requisite level of reputation that can form a substitute for legal protection is not easy to attain, however. Transactions over innovation are characterized by a high degree of suspicion and initial mistrust. Innovators are wary about disclosing their innovations for fear
that the information will leak to others. Buyers and financiers of innovation, for their part, will be reluctant to transact without full disclosure since most innovations are commercially valueless. Given that
reputation usually results from repeated behavior over time, it may be
very difficult to build a good reputation in this environment.

156

We thank Phil Weiser for pointing out this example to us.

